

Immigration in select OECD Countries and the Feasibility of Assimilation

A Research Thesis

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The incorporation of immigrants into society has become more difficult as the composition of immigrants has changed, as well as native citizens' increasingly demanding criteria for assimilation have become more intense. Over the last few decades, governments have responded by revising their naturalization requirements and changing their immigration policies. Currently, the outlook on immigrants assimilating is grim. Immigrants migrate for different reasons, but when they are confronted with poor living conditions, discrimination and a lack of government support they become less likely to undertake naturalization—a necessary step in assimilation. Approximately 3.1 percent of the world's population lives outside their country of origin (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2009); however, an additional 13 percent, according to a 2009 Gallup Poll, desired to permanently reside outside their native countries. It is not a myth that the most sought after countries to immigrate to are affluent western democracies, i.e., the United States, Canada, nations in the European Union (EU), Australia, and New Zealand, among others. In the aforementioned Gallup Poll, of the 259, 542 respondents, 30.5 percent would like to move to North America—overall 25 percent to the United States alone, and an additional 30 percent of respondents desire to live within the European Union. (Espinova & Ray, 2009).

The number of individuals migrating over the last ten years has increased from 150 million in 2000 to, roughly, 214 million today. This resulted in a signaling to prosperous countries that immigration will not be slowing. Immigration to the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached 91 million foreign nationals in 2005, while 43 percent of the migration entering OECD countries came from other OECD countries (Widmaier & Dumont, 2011). This clearly

demonstrates that regulating the inflow of migrants proves to be just as difficult. Even with development aid and growth in the economies of poor and developing countries, the reality of the free market economy is that there always will be winners and losers. While there are many that may wish to relocate for better economic stability, to reunite with family members or to escape persecution and violence, they may find that they not be able to due to their lack of fiscal and human capital or denied requests for asylum, individuals motivations for emigrating vary, signifying there is no single root cause (Terrazas, 2011). The international community has been seeing a change in the composition and treatment of immigrants.

With the release of the OECD's 2013 edition of the International Migration Outlook, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría published his remarks on the new publication, in which he highlighted some of the more prominent findings on current immigration patterns. During the most recent recession, there were three years during which immigration flows modestly declined; however, since 2011 there has been a 2 percent increase in immigration to OECD countries, primarily due to an overall 15 percent increase in immigration to Europe in 2011 alone. There is great optimism that new national and supranational policies, such as is the European Union's 'Blue Card' Directive, will attract more highly-skilled and highly educated immigrants into OECD member states (Europa, 2009). Despite the progress, immigrants still face discrimination in the labor force, as well as, higher unemployment rates than native-born citizens. For example, on OCD members in 2011, on average, encountered a 5 percent increase in immigrant unemployment compared to a 3 percent increase for natives-born citizens (Gurría, 2013).

As a greater number of people want to immigrate abroad, particularly to wealthier countries, governments struggle to balance the large influx of immigration applications with the wishes and demands of their citizens. That is not to say that citizens truly know what is best for a country; for example, in any given country there is a segment of the population that believes immigrants are a burden to society and hurt the economy. Through empirical studies, these claims have been tested and the results have been proven to be divided, at best. On one hand, Borjas's study in 2003 shows that low-skilled, low-educated immigrants have a negative effect on the wages of both previous immigrants and native workers. On the other hand, it has also been shown that these effects are minor and contribute very little to the wages of previous immigrant and native workers (Card, 2005; Ottaviano & Peri, 2006). It is typically the native-born, low-educated blue-collar workers who feel most threatened by immigrants, and thus wish to restrict immigration (OECD, 2010). However, regulating the flow of immigrants is not the only challenge faced by governments today, many governments must also contend with effectively assimilating the immigrants already present into the population at-large.

The process by which countries incorporate immigrants into their mainstream culture has been extensively written about over the last two decades. While some countries have an easier time incorporating their immigrants into the native population, it depends on a variety of factors. It may not always be the case that some countries' institutions are better suited to the task and their native populations are more welcoming than others, but rather it may be that the ease of assimilation depends on the composition of the foreign nationals. Some countries receive their largest percentages of immigrants from countries culturally similar to their own, as is the case with Austria receiving its

highest number of migrants from Germany, or neighboring countries, with which they share the same language, such as in the case of the UK, receiving its largest immigrant populations from Ireland, Australia and the United States; or in Switzerland, where three of the four official languages are used by their immigrant populations from Italy, Germany and France (OECD, 2013). Moreover, the genealogical and cultural similarities between these groups suggest those immigrants would be inclined to have Christian and democratic values and moral codes. The native population typically has the most outspoken opinion on whether or not immigrant populations have successfully been assimilated, which is determined according to terms set by the natives. Studies point out several criteria that natives wish to see immigrants display to prove their assimilation: effective use of official language, recognition and acceptance of culture, lifestyle, and traditions, participation in the work force and community, and becoming a citizen of the country (Alba & Nee, 1997; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Antonsich 2012).

The question arise that if given the current domestic systems, will naturalization and incorporation be enough to prove to natives that first generation immigrants are succeeding assimilating to the native culture? I seek to show that the demands for and expectations of assimilation by the native populations of the host countries are too high given the limited resources that governments provide immigrants. To close, I will explore the current literature and theories, public opinions (through previous research), social surveys like the European Social Survey and the World Social Survey, citizenship laws and available programs, and the trends of immigrant resentment, tension and discrimination in western societies. Finally, I will try to explain, why, in light of all these data, meeting society's assimilation and the country's naturalization requirements,

immigrants still struggle to prove to the native population that they have successfully assimilated.

I. Natives' High Demands concerning Assimilation and an Exploration into the Data on Public Opinion of Immigrants provided by Social Surveys

Reactions to immigrants fall on wide continuum, from 'we need stricter migration policy, deport them!' and 'immigrants are taking all our benefits' to 'open our borders so we can invite more in!' and 'immigrants strengthen our economy!'. Whereas governments regulate and sometimes provide sources for immigrant incorporation, the native population judges the process, and through public polls, voices their opinions. Governments are required to balance the public's opinions, the demands of the business sector and economy, and the incorporation of immigrants. Immigration policy typically tries to realistically meet the demands from the market, while protecting the wishes of its citizens. Countries continuously adjust the number of admissions granted by type of immigrant—temporary worker, student, reunified family member, among others—and there has been a recent trend to tighten restrictions on asylum seekers. The number of countries to which one must swear an oath after naturalization has increased over the last few decades, and some countries impose compulsory language and culture classes while others require certification to a certain level in the official language. These are just some examples of how governments work to satisfy the immigration concerns within their borders. An important yet less frequently discussed topic is the public opinions on how migrants should incorporate themselves into the host country. Over the last decade there

has been significant research into the incorporation strategies, the perception of migrants by the majority, and the demands that majority cultures in western democracies make regarding the incorporation of immigrants.

Due to the post World War II economic boom in many developed countries, governments mass-recruited workers without any formal implementation of migration or incorporation policies, or in the case of the United States, without a true enforcement of the borders until the 1980s (Ireland, 2004; Zolberg & Long, 1999). In terms of incorporation doctrine, the period between the 1960s until the mid to late 1970s is described as a period of assimilation, where migrants were expected to forsake their own traditions, cultural and social behaviors and be absorbed into the new culture. This usually involved adapting to a new way of life, adopting a new attitude, language and values (Alba & Nee, 1997; Antonsich, 2012).

Multiculturalism took root during the 1970s as a new way to incorporate migrants. At its core is the expectation that the state should be tolerant of different cultures within its borders and that this diversity should be equally protected. Multiculturalism seeks to create policy and practice that gives equal attention to the cultural needs of minority communities. It does so by guaranteeing representation in the state's legislative bodies, funding for ethnic education systems or bilingual education in schools, and even extending rights to religious communities. In return, immigrants are expected to respect the countries basic, legal, cultural, social rules. Critics of multiculturalism argue that there is a lack of reciprocity, in that the state unilaterally provides rights, benefits and means of incorporation, but the immigrant groups voluntarily segregate themselves (Sartori, 2000; Joppke, 2001).

The 1990s mark the return and revamping of the practices of assimilation. Brubaker distinguishes the usage of assimilation today by understanding the core meaning. In the earlier, transitive usage: to *make* or *treat* similarly—or in a biological sense, to absorb—assimilation is the absorption of migrants into the new culture. He argues, however, that today’s usage is actually the intransitive meaning ‘to *become* similar’ where the emphasis is on the process by which assimilation occurs (Brubaker, 2001). In a related, new theory of assimilation, commonly called neo-assimilation theory, (Alba & Nee, 1997), there is an emphasis on the role that institutions play in the assimilation process. Incorporation practices today differ from earlier models of incorporation because in general, countries do not adopt only one doctrine over the other. They instead have characteristics of both multiculturalism and assimilation, and reflect the wishes of their citizens, the demands of the market, and the attempt to mitigate the influx of immigration. These models usually rely on a mutual, as opposed to one-way, incorporation processes, where the government provide some support and resources for integration and immigrants are expected to accept and respect the laws and culture.

Similarly, no two countries’ incorporation regimens are the same (Brubaker, 2001). Many have similarities in one sphere, such as the type of immigrant they recruit, but have opposing programs in another, like whether they provide social rights to migrants. Three instances in Europe in the last decade display how different countries and the EU handle the integration of Islamic migrants. In 1995 the German Constitutional Court ruled that crucifixes or any Christian relic could not be displayed in public schools, as non- or other-religion students should not have to learn “under the cross”, whereas the European court of Human Rights in *Lautsi vs. Italy* (2011) ruled that the crucifix was not

a religious relic, but a symbol of the national culture and identity (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). France, on the other hand, in an attempt to validate their secular values, passed a law to take all religious symbols out of public schools, which meant no head scarves for female Muslim students. In 2010, France banned all face coverings in public places, which included the veil-portion of the burqa, which led to serious riots in France shortly after it was passed in the National Assembly.

A 2010 study by the OECD researched on public opinions and migration using Social Survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 1-4, the World Social Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). In the first stage they took into account demographic variables, political orientation, highest achieved level of education, the labor market and the spatial or heritable proximity to migrants. The second stage included the determinants of preferences on the economic, political and economic variables from the first stage. With this data viewed against a series of immigration themed questions, they were able to more clearly understand people's perception of immigrants and their impact on economy and cultural life, (OECD 2010). This study found that "respondents demand more in terms of economic or cultural benefits from immigrants of a different ethnic origin than from those of a similar one", for example, respondents from France, the UK and German demand greater benefits from immigration to accept a more open migration policy (OECD, 2010; 131).

On average, Nordic states have had less immigration than most countries for several reasons: they did not have colonies like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France, and their location and isolation make them more difficult to reach for low-skilled migrants of low-economic means. These countries' significantly fewer encounters

with migration as a whole may account for their more inclusive policies, and responses to survey questions. When asked if migrants have a positive impact on culture, over 70 percent of respondents from Finland, and Sweden, and approximately 69 percent from the Netherlands responded favorably. In contrast, in a survey comparing opinion scores of 21 European countries in order to determine the countries' most important immigrant criteria, every country except Poland rated "the immigrant's commitment to the country's way of life" first, then "the immigrant having the work skills the country needs" followed by "the immigrant's close family is living in the country". The 2013 *International Migration Outlook* country breakdowns show the positive relationship of public opinion and the breakdown of the inflow of migrants into European countries. European countries either had a majority 'free movement'—referring to the Schengen Zone, which allows citizens of the EU member states free movement and visa-free residency up to three months without registering with local authorities—or they had closer percentages, creating mixture of 'Free Movement', 'Work', and/or 'Family Reunification':

- 'Free movement': Germany (67.9 percent of the inflow), Austria (65.5 percent), Norway (63.8 percent) Netherlands (58.3 percent)
- Mixtures:
 - France: 39.9 percent Family and 33.7 percent Free movement;
 - Italy: 33 percent Work, 28 percent Family, 35 percent Free Movement;
 - Spain: 38.9 percent Work and 42.6 percent Free Movement;
 - Sweden: 37.7 percent Family and 38 percent Free Movement 38 percent;
 - UK: 35 percent Work and 22.6 percent Free Movement (OECD, 2010).

Moving forward, the general conclusion drawn from the OECD study is that the belief that immigration has a positive impact on culture, the economy, leads to favoring a more open immigration policy. Other important factors are age, education, state of the economy and work environment, and granting social rights to immigrants. The surveys show that the older a respondent is, the more likely they will have negative feelings about immigrants, economically and culturally. One explanation of these feelings could be attributed to the perception of how benefits are distributed. As older citizens are more dependent on pensions and government assistance, believing that immigrants are receiving already scarce benefits would lead these citizens to support a restriction on immigration. Other reasons could be length of exposure to, previous resentful feelings for, or politics toward migrants. The data provided about gender is not consistent. Whereas women are more apt to support increased migration of different ethnicities, they also are more likely to have negative feelings towards immigrants when considering the economic impacts.

Higher skilled and educated individuals favor more open immigration policy, whereas the lower skilled and educated are more likely to be in favor of restrictions. This result is seen in ESS, WVS and ISSP data, and a considerable amount of literature is available that finds education level is an important determinate on natives' opinions of migrants. Furthermore, in occupations and industries, where there is heavy competition with migrants, are less supportive of immigrants and vice versa (Otega & Polavieja, 2009). Highly skilled, highly educated natives may not even be confronted with as much migrant competition, and therefore do not see immigrants as a threat. Data from 2005 shows that 30 percent of highly skilled, highly educated migrants work in jobs for which

they are overqualified (Widmaier & Dumond, 2011). The reason for the lack in competition from those highly skilled immigrants largely has to do with the transferability of university and tertiary degrees from foreign countries, the perception that the quality of the education may not be as distinguished, and the fact that the immigrants' language abilities may not be sufficient to work in their ideal careers.

The research conducted by Hainmueller & Hiscox suggests that education level and skill level are synonymous, and opinions on immigration have less to do with the competition for jobs than with the difference in cultural values. They also suggest that the employment and income of immigrants only minutely affects the economy. More educated citizens are less racist and find cultural diversity to be valuable (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). There is also a higher incidence of anti-immigrant sentiment among EU citizens who show evidence of prejudice towards minorities and immigrants, political conservatism, and skepticism concerning the European Union (Kessler & Freeman, 2007).

A quarter of the respondents from Nordic countries, like Denmark, Norway and Sweden (30 percent, 26 percent, 36 percent respectively) are most supportive of the idea of granting rights to immigrants immediately, without any prior contributions. Whereas nearly half of the respondents from Hungary, Slovenia Poland and the Netherlands (65 percent, 58 percent, 48 percent, 47 percent respectively) believe eligibility should be reliant on citizenship and some even suggest it be restricted to native-born citizen only. Citizens who rely on benefits are more likely to favor restrictions on migrants' access to them, as they want less competition for their benefits (OECD, 2010).

In asking native participants about whether they believe migrants are a positive impact on the economy, only Norway and Switzerland responded with 50 percent agreement, while the country with the lowest agreement was Hungary, which had well below 20 percent (OECD, 2010). Countries with higher per capita Gross Domestic Products (GDP) are on average less open to migration, as better off countries typically have a higher flow of immigrants, and the migrants tend to be less skilled and educated than the natives (Mayda, 2006). Having a large proportion of unskilled, less educated migrants concentrated in certain industries will result in more dissatisfaction of the native workers who typically work in those industries. There additionally is clear association between immigration flows, economic conditions and anti-immigrant sentiments. When the economy worsens, and there is a presence of migrants, then there is a call for immigrant restrictions (Kessler & Freeman, 2005).

Having discussed the trends of natives' general opinions of and thoughts on immigrants, the next step is to discuss what majorities believe is the best way to prove assimilation into their societies. In general it is expected that immigrants must be able to effectively communicate in the host country's official language, must be productive, proactive and participating members of society and the work force, must accept and abide by the host country's laws and customs and must intend to become a citizens (Huntington, 2004; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Antonsich, 2012). In Paxton and Mughan's research on designing an assimilation threat scale, they specified their belief that natives were not threatened by individual immigrants, but by immigrant groups' failure to assimilate into their culture.

Majority populations in western democracies emphasize the importance of learning the host countries' official languages, or, for some countries, Canada and Switzerland for example, the official language spoken in the region in which one migrates. Language is the easiest way to understand the basics of a culture. By having an understanding and grasp of the language spoken in a new country, it ensures the ability to discuss one's needs, desires, and ambitions with natives. It further allows one to be more productive and efficient in the labor force, and also, allows one to start building relationships within the community. As for participation in the community, language is the key that starts the process to understanding a new culture. Languages are full of idioms and phrases that find their meanings in old wives tales and stories; they connect generations and, like organisms, are constantly evolving. Even when learning a new language, the native language is still retained. Only in the future generations of migrant origin do we see a gradual loss of the native tongue. The acquisition of more than one language is also quite common in most elementary and secondary school programs.

Another serious debate about languages concerns when and where it is appropriate to speak the native versus newly acquired language. Some natives believe that immigrants should be allowed to speak their native language at home, while others believe migrants should speak the host countries' language all the time (Paxton & Mughan, 2006). Mastering new languages takes immense practice and full immersion. As an adult, because the brain is fully developed, one learns languages at a slower rate than children. Reading and writing may be a good way to start getting comfortable with a new language, unfortunately this passive learning leads to the use of dictionaries and grammar books as a crutch. Speaking forces students of a new language out of their comfort zone

by making them react, forcing them to think more quickly and to answer in a timely manner. Native speakers also appreciate non-native speakers more and them better when they are actively engaged in what they are trying to communicate. Speaking the new language at home gives everyone greater possibility for practicing in a safe environment. Since children will be exposed to the new language in their new schools, they will become quickly acquainted with it and will be able to help their family members. When immigrants become more advanced in the language, it ensures that their children will be even better prepared for school. There is no doubt that without well developed language skills, school becomes more difficult, children perform worse in classes, and they cannot build strong relationships with their native peers, forcing the migrant children into the out-group comprised of other immigrant children, where they build relationships within that group.

Natives perceive adult migrants who stick to their enclaves and do not often venture out into society negatively. Natives typically believe that by voluntarily excluding themselves from the dominant culture, minorities push themselves further away and are ultimately refusing to be part of the country's identity. The loyalty to ones cultural heritage is not the issue; rather it is the disregard of allegiance to the new country (Joppke, 2001), with special concern for the blatant lack of trying. Socially integrating, for example, by making friends with or marrying a native, improves the likeliness that an immigrant will naturalize (Hochman, 2011).

Immigrants who are believed to be productive in the community, in their employment (or their search for it) and in the acquisition of education either for themselves or their children, are seen as further along in the assimilation process. In the

United States, having a job and being a hard worker are positive assimilation characteristics because Americans identify themselves with work-oriented values. Having those qualities is generally looked at positively as signs of embracing the American culture. However that does come with a qualification. Having a job and being a hard worker may be good qualities, but Americans also value education as the best way to improve one's current economic, financial, and intellectual circumstances. One huge difference Americans notice in Asian and Indian immigrants in comparison to Hispanic immigrants is the value that they place on education (Huntington, 2004; Paxton & Mughan, 2006). Both groups are perceived as hard workers, but the Asian and Indian communities have much more profound devotion to furthering their education. Additionally, a good education leads to higher probability of a stable job, and migrants with steady jobs have higher naturalization rates (Hochman, 2011).

Another demand natives make is for immigrants to accept, respect, and appreciate their host country's and society's laws, culture and values (Antonsich, 2012). For countries that do not practice the purist multiculturalism, local state and federal laws are held above all common religious laws, and exceptions are rarely made. The migrants' respect and acceptance of culture and values can be displayed in learning the small gestures and manners of the host country, such as holding the door open for someone, leaving a 15 percent-20 percent gratuity in restaurants for American waiters, or being hard-working and ambitious.

Culture appreciation helps assimilate migrants into the society and can induce new behaviors that mirror the natives. Individuals, who wear the traditional dress of their native country seem "out of place" and are notably different. Many believe that "diversity

must, instead be confined to the private sphere”(Antonsich, 2012; 70). In 2004 the National Assembly in France banned any religious symbols from public schools, provided by the school or student. Thus under that law headscarves could not be worn by Muslim children. Six years later, with the passing of the law banning the adornment of any face coverings in public, riots broke out from Muslims as the law included any burqa that shielded the face.

The final demand is that immigrants should strive for naturalization. By the legal point at which immigrants can naturalize, natives want immigrants to associate being in the country with a sense of belonging and identity and share in the loyalty and attachment to it with all other citizens. However, due to the increases in undocumented migration, natives have become fixated on the legal status of migrants. Migrants, legal or not, are often stereotyped as undocumented migrants, who are viewed as freeloaders and are easily turned into the scapegoats in economic downturns. This scapegoating and other forms of discrimination does indeed lower odds of naturalization.

Becoming a naturalized citizen is not the end point of assimilation, especially in the eyes of the natives. Many of the Europeans who Antonsich’s interviewed believe that assimilation is a gradual, inevitable phenomenon—that given a long period of time, a migrant will gradually become part of the community. Contemporary immigrants are assimilating faster than their predecessors; however, the degree to which immigrants assimilate depends on their countries of origin (Vigdor, 2008). In one of Antonsich’s interviews, an Italian male representative of an industrial association spoke of the north bound migration of southern Italians looking for jobs during the 1950s;

“...when hundreds of [Italian] southerners were arriving at the train station ... yes,

they were still Italians, but at the time the *terrone* [derogative term for southern Italians] was really perceived as an alien in places like Como...Well, nobody thinks of it anymore. They integrated and they are perceived as normal Comaschi [people from Como]. At that time there was a big industrial push . . . but I still remember local people in the bars complaining about *terrone* who shout too much, who are dirty . . . the same narrow mentality which applies today against the *extra-comunitari* [migrants from outside the EU]" (Antonsich, 2012; 66-67).

II. Migration policies, citizenship laws, resources available to migrants

Over the past thirty years, naturalization in western democracies has become less restrictive as countries have eased some requirements, such as reducing the number of years migrants must have legally resided in a country. Several countries relaxed their *jus sanguinis* policies, or "citizenship by blood". A notable example is Germany, in which, children had only received citizenship from German-born citizens. Currently, children now can be awarded citizenship if at least one of the parents is a legal permanent resident and has resided in Germany for at least eight years. However, in easing such criteria and making citizenship more obtainable to immigrants, other, more demanding requirements, such as minimum language proficiency requirements, knowledge about the country's culture and laws, renunciation of former nationalities, and oath to the new country were added. For many countries, these new requirements are proof that the assimilation demands of the native population are being fulfilled. The OECD finds that, on average, more immigrants are becoming eligible for citizenship in their new countries of

residence, and more immigrants are naturalizing. In 2011, 18.1 million immigrants, 45 percent of the immigrant population, became naturalized US citizens. Of that 18.1 million, 47 percent have naturalized since 2000. However, as several countries' immigrant populations increase, they are seeing a decline in the percent of their immigrant population seeking naturalization. Thus, even though on average OECD countries have a higher percentage of naturalizations, the percent of naturalizations as a percentage of the foreign populations is decreasing. For example in 2005 Austria's naturalization rate as a percentage of their foreign population was 4.5 percent, but by 2011 it had dropped to 0.7 percent. On the other hand, some countries have experienced fluctuations in their foreign population naturalizing Sweden, for instance, had a naturalization rate of 8.8 percent in 2000, which had fallen to 5.5 percent by 2010, but picked up to 5.8 percent in 2011 (OECD, 2013). Even as citizenship eligibility rises among established immigrants, the percentage of eligible immigrants who actually acquire citizenship is low because of the increasing requirements expected of applicants.

Obtaining citizenship is considered an important part of the immigrant integration process (Freeman, 2004; Paxton & Mughan, 2005; Hochman, 2011). It provides immigrants access to full political and social rights, from which they were otherwise barred, and it proves the commitment and dedication to the country that immigrants are expected to demonstrate. The decision to naturalize from the migrant prospective is challenging, since one must weigh the advantages of becoming a naturalized citizen with the prospect of never migrating back to their homeland. In many instances, immigrants must choose to forsake their nationality of origin for their new citizenship; as many countries no longer allow dual citizenship (OECD, 2010).

In fact, the idea that a country may not allow dual citizenship, may add to the notion of “earning” one’s right to citizenship. Countries generally do not forcibly require an immigrant to revoke their previous nationality if it could impose negative consequences on a migrant, and often make exceptions (Liebig, 2011). One might argue that these additions only further potential exclusionary migration politics and thus add to preventing social exclusion in liberal democracies is that countries would have to ensure citizenship as a universal entitlement (Farhendorf, 1985). A close illustration of this idea is the principle of being a citizen of the EU by way of being a citizen to a member state. Reducing duration of stay and relaxing the laws regarding where and to whom migrant (or migrant origin) children are born does not mask the fact that some countries’ naturalization criteria take a great deal of dedication.

Individual countries have different criteria to access citizenship. For the most part, the applicant must be over 18 years old, unless applying for citizenship as a family, in which case minors apply under their parents, as is the case with the United States and Norway. The minimum duration of stay in the new country ranges from three years in Canada, Australia and Belgium to up to ten or twelve years in Italy, Austria and Switzerland. However, most countries’ minimum requirements fall between five and eight years. Swearing an oath to the country after being granted citizenship is popular. The oaths are typically pledges of allegiance to the country and its values. They usually end with a small reception meant to celebrate the new citizens’ achievement. Some countries do not have oaths, but will have a small celebration to honor those who took the necessary steps to become official citizens.

Additionally, several states have either language ability testing requirements or a minimum language proficiency that must be obtained in order to be naturalized. For instance, Canada, France and Germany have minimum levels of proficiency that immigrants must obtain prior to applying for citizenship. Immigrants must provide proper documentation with their application. The United States and Canada conduct their language test orally, where the migrant must be able to communicate effectively with the interviewer. Language is perceived to be an integral part of assimilation into a host country, socially and economically. Thus the inclusion of a language examination is a practical tool for assessing immigrants on the grounds that they understand the language and will be functioning members of society (Antonisch, 2012).

Some countries provide language courses free or heavily subsidized. In Canada, all qualified adult permanent residents have the right to free language training, and this extends to those migrants who the government intends to grant permanent status to, namely family under family reunification, and asylum seekers. The government works through provincial governments, school boards, community colleges and immigrant-serving organizations to provide language courses. Canada offers the course in both English and French and migrants can also prove proficiency in their application by either proving English or French third-party qualifying examinations or a secondary degree in English or French as a the field of study (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 2012). Similar to Canada, the German system can require an immigrant to take language courses and which the local immigration office would determine when the migrant files for residency. The Department for Migration and Refugees of the German government subsidizes the language course for all migrants. Participants are only required to pay EUR

1,20 for every hour-long lesson, or EUR 792 for the 660 hour course provided by a third party language institute. Sixty of the 660 hours are dedicated to an integrations course, which goes over German laws, customs, rights and everyday life. The course ends with an exam and, due to the citizenship language requirements, participants should aim to obtain a B1 level, which tests one's ability to understand and communicate about everyday topics (work, school, free time activities), as well as describe experiences, hopes and dreams, and clearly express themselves. If they are not able to achieve that level, they have the option to retake courses, but at the full price (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [BAMF], 2011). The Norwegian system is only free for newly arrived refugees and family members granted family reunification. Their requirements include taking 550 hours of a language and 50 hours of Norwegian society class until one reaches at least a B1 on their language exam (Utlendingsdirektoratet, 2012). Other countries, like the United States, have no particular strategy and like the United States, delegate language programs to an array of institutions, like community colleges, private educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations, etc. (McHugh & Challinor, 2011).

A citizenship exam portion of the application has also become very common, as most countries require some knowledge of the laws and rights as citizens. The general content usually covers, but is not limited to, the country's specific type of democracy, important dates in the country's history, the rights granted to the citizens, laws and customs, etc. Governments will either provide applicants with material covering all the information they need to know for the exam, for example, the DVD "Pass the United States Citizenship Test and Interview (US Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS), 2013). Countries may also dedicate a part of the language courses to modules on citizenship, daily life, laws of the country. The courses are for immediate integration into the society, so when it comes to applying for citizenship, the migrant is well versed on how life in that country is.

Native-born citizens are very protective of their social rights, access to benefits and voting, and thus, can be very forthcoming in their frustration when they believe migrants are to be a burden on the welfare state. The Netherlands has a rather progressive policy that allows for non-naturalized migrants access to rights that are usually reserved only for naturalized citizens in other countries. Migrants are allowed to work in the civil service, except they cannot work for the police or military. They allow non-citizens who have legally resided in the Netherlands for at least five years the right to vote locally. Also, many municipal councils are ethnically diverse, including some members who are not Dutch citizens (Evanilli, 2007).

Canada has three settlement programs: the Immigrant Settlement and Adaption Program (ISAP), which incorporates the Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) and the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) and the Host Program. Each program offers a variety of services to help orient migrants to Canadian way of life, learn the language and skills to find a job. ISAP distributes money to immigrant-serving organizations for the purpose of generally educating migrants on life in Canada, providing resources like counseling, employment guidance, and translation and interpretation to those with poor English or French skills. The COA falls beneath the ISAP, but it an orientation program for migrants in their countries of origin. LINC provides free language training course in English or French to all adult newcomers. Finally the Host Program pairs immigrants

with Canadian volunteers, who will help with the integration process by instructing immigrants on additional community resources and activities, giving the immigrant an opportunity to further practice their English or French with a native speaker. The most important features of the Host Program is its dedication to promoting inclusion of immigrants into society as well as to cultivate cross-cultural friendships (Elrick, 2010; CIC, 2012).

In the United States immigration policy, only naturalized citizens are fully eligible for all public benefits. These include: Medicaid, Medicare, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), cash assistance and Supplement Security Income (SSI) and Social Security. However, the United States's welfare system has a means-tested welfare and a hidden welfare state component. For a citizen to be eligible for any welfare benefits must be well below the poverty line and the hidden welfare state materializes in the form of tax breaks. A legal permanent resident must wait five years to be eligible for these benefits. Currently there are 40 million immigrants in the United States, which is 12.9 percent of the population and 43.8 percent of the 40 million are naturalized citizens. Additionally, refugee and asylum seekers only receive benefits if they meet the program requirement (Ku & Bruen, 2013).

Many Americans believe that immigrant families are freeloading off of the government, but that is not necessarily the case. Children born in the United States to immigrant parents are entitled to welfare benefits; however, the government only pays for the costs incurred by the child. So yes, immigrant families can get benefits, but it is through the citizenship of a child, and the assistance they receive only covers that child.

Furthermore, temporary workers, students and undocumented migrants are not eligible for any benefits or social rights, but they will pay taxes in the forms of excise and sales taxes, property taxes as part of their rent and if they work they will pay local, state, federal taxes. Ku and Bruen of the CATO Institute found that overall immigrants use less benefits than natives. They shifted their focus to only low-income natives and eligible migrants because of the means tested welfare system and only they are eligible for it. The cost of benefits usage for immigrant adults is 42 percent below the cost of the natives and the cost of immigrant children are 66 percent below that of their native counterpart (Ku & Bruen, 2013).

III. Resentment and Misconceptions

“The dominant explanation of popular hostility to immigrants is realistic group conflict theory, which holds that immigrants are resented for threatening natives’ economic and material interests in the form of jobs, crime, education and taxation (Blumer, 1958; Hardin 1995)” (as cited from Paxton & Mughan, 2006). In a study on the positive determinant of naturalization in Germany, Oshrat Hochman (2011) found that discrimination does indeed lower odds of naturalization. It was not until recently that anti-discrimination laws began debuting on an international level. After the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the EU began an anti-discrimination campaign. It sought to make mandatory directives for member states to begin implementing new anti-discrimination programs and policies (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). This was during a shift in politics from ‘socially exclusive’, blocking immigrants from participating in their rights, to ‘socially inclusive’, or rights that kept individuals from being marginalized and

ensured opportunity and resources to participate economically, socially and culturally. The social dilemma in Europe is how to effectively update old policies to better incorporate, but not marginalize, the inflow of migrants into European societies without disrupting the traditions and customs of the majority (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). Resistance to immigrants is still shared by approximately half of the European population today (Coenders, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2003) and is illustrated in public opinion and institutions. Often, this resistance causes ethnic tensions and conflicts, for example in France. It also caused several right-wing political movements in Europe over the last decade. It appears that the old racist, xenophobic and misinformed opinions have resurfaced.

Although the United States is a country built by immigrants, its immigration policies and political parties seem to contradict this origin. American nativism, or “the intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (“un-American”) connections” (Higham, 1988; 4) has displayed at various times in the history a deep-rooted xenophobic political agenda. Nativist groups saw characteristics in foreign enclaves that made Americans believe they would fail to assimilate. There are three important themes that play a central role in nativism. First, the anti-Catholic “Know Nothing” Party of the 1850s viewed catholic immigrants as agents of the pope, there to undermine the liberal democracy and institutions. Claiming Catholicism lacked the ability to blend with the American concept of individual freedoms, the Know Nothing Party worked on excluding Catholics from the political arena by restricting naturalization laws. Second, immigrants defecting to the US were coming from countries facing political and socio-economic change, spawning an anti-radicalism sentiment. During this

time, revolutions were fought on the principles of political and social change, which contrasted with the American revolutionists who fought only for the political change. The third theme started as Americans began defining the American identity with an unquestioned assumption of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. The Anglo-American culture thus came to embody and conform to this identity of superiority (Higham, 1988).

Nativism was really racism in disguise. During the periods of high nativism, a lot of restrictive and discriminatory policies were created in the United States. Policies like the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, which empowered the President to deport migrants on the grounds that they were threats to the American government. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 legalized discrimination, and restricted legal naturalization to the Chinese. These acts and behaviors led to the introduction of mandatory literacy tests, which disenfranchised the African Americans. Today, there have been recent resurgences of nativism in state immigration laws, especially in states with high Hispanic populations in the Southwest. In 1994, the Republican governor of California supported Proposition 187, which sought to strip education and health privileges away from migrant children in California and force all social agencies to check the legal status of migrants upon administering any assistance (Migration News, 1994; Zolberg & Long, 1999). Californian voters passed this proposition, but by 1999 it was removed. In 1996, the federal government passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). The PRA defined and restricted non-citizen eligibility to benefits and services provided by the local, state and federal level. The IIRAIRA aimed to

strengthen security at the southern border and define new protocols and penalties for employment verification. Similarly in 2012, after surviving a Supreme Court Challenge, Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 has one provision that allows police officers to check an individual's immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion the individual is an illegal immigrant (Cohen & Mears, 2012). This law essentially gives police the opportunity to racially profile migrants in the state of Arizona. The recently proposed immigration bill became a source of contention between the two parties in the US Senate. However, the Tea Party Republicans have been the most outspoken. They are working to dismiss the bill due to the proposed section on the "pathway to citizenship" for illegal immigrants. The Tea Party Republicans believe that by passing this law, the United States would be rewarding illegal immigrants for breaking laws (Miron, 2013).

Could the US Republican Party faction, the Tea Party, be a relative of the radical right-wing populist parties that emerged during In Europe in the mid 80's and 90's? Radical right-wing populist parties reject the establishment of a socio-cultural and political system. They believe in the classic liberal free market, reduced roll of government and criticize high taxes. "They are right wing in their rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups and their appeal to xenophobia" (Betz, 1993; 414). The immigrant inflow into Western Europe over the last fifty years has changed the demographic composition of Europe, that by the end of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, more Europeans were describing themselves as racist. In a 1989 study on racism and xenophobia, between 11 and 14 percent of Europeans were "concerned about the presence of people of different races, religions and nationalities" (Betz, 1993; 414). Later in 1997, the European Commission

conducted a surveys that's results revealed a third of the of respondents openly considered themselves "quite" or "very racist", of that third, 9 percent considered themselves "very racist". Of the respondents from Belgium, France and Austria, 22, 16 and 14 percent respectively, considered themselves "very racist (Eurobarometer, 1997).

An environment such as this led to the success of the right-wing populist parties gaining seats in European governments. To Betz, the parties' successes "mark the revival of racism" (Betz 1993; 388). Several European countries had prominent radical right-wing political parties. After Italy's *Lega Lombarda* success in 1990, the party merged with similar parties in Northern Italy and became Italy's fourth largest party in 1992. Austria's FPÖ (Freedom Party) was successful in capturing thirty-three seats in Parliament in 1990. France's *Front National* gained traction throughout the 1980s, getting 9.6 percent of the vote in the 1988 national elections. Belgium's *Vlaams Blok* had twelve parliamentary seats in 1991, ten more than in 1987. However, *Vlaams Bloc* became *Vlaams Belang* after being convicted for being racist and was forced to disband in 2004 (BBC, 2004). Germany's *Republikaner* faired much better in the state elections in Baden-Württemberg than nationally after reunification. Most surprising were the parties that had successes in Scandinavia with Sweden's *Ny Demokrati* and Denmark's and Norway's Progress Party. These parties were successful at attracting an electorate, however there was an overrepresentation of lower middle class blue-collar workers. Some parties, like Austria's FPÖ and the Norway's Progress Party also attracted some young, white-collar male voters. *Vlaams Blok's* and *Republikaner's* supporters were typically poorly educated, blue-collar workers. Workers who found themselves marginalized by modernization and globalization traditionally supported right-wing

populist parties. These right-wing parties also appealed to young professionals and recent graduates, who find no prospects in the labor market due to deteriorating economic conditions (Betz; 1993).

Ideologically, the Tea Party resembles a radical, right wing populist party. Members believe in low taxation rate, limited government regulation and spending, and a free market—a mixture of Republican and Libertarian ideals. They are apprehensive of a Democratic-led government, as they believe their personal well-being and economic wealth are at stake. However, the demographics of the Tea Party tend to be wealthier and better educated than the general public. They are typically married, white males who are over the age of 45 (New York Times & CBS News Poll, 2010). Taking that into consideration, their objection to the “pathway to citizenship” section of the immigration bill, while expressing no concern for the increase in spending from an increase in border security, seems increasingly more reminiscent of an anti-immigrant, nativist sentiment. Most resentment towards immigrants in America is in regards to the 11 million illegal immigrants. The largest population represented is Hispanics, which are largely located in the Southwest and Florida. Many Americans perceive Hispanics in the United States to be unwilling or unable to assimilate (Huntington, 2004). The primary use of foreign language usage, namely Spanish, affects the public’s perception on Hispanics ability to assimilate. In the United States, it is required that election ballots are available in Spanish and there has also been an increase in Spanish media and bilingual school programs which have all contributed to heightening the monolingual American’s negative perceptions. Even though Spanish is still the most popular foreign language in high schools, the language is apparently the crux of Hispanics inability to assimilate. There is

a belief that due to the resources available in Spanish, immigrating Hispanics lack the responsibility to learn English. As language is such an important part of culture, Americans expect migrants to learn, speak and appreciate the English language. When migrants abstain from learning English, it becomes clear that the migrants are not assimilating.

The incorporation of Muslims in Europe is similar to the incorporation of Hispanics in the United States, except, instead of language, the issues revolve around religion. For centuries, religion and culture have been intertwined. Recently governments and courts around the world have questioned the relationship due to changing demographics. Simply, culture is a way of life. It is a way that a people live. Religion is the belief in a set of moral codes and how those codes guide followers (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). After hundreds of years of relative isolation, it is evident religion can define a people's identity, thus highlighting Europe's struggle with the inclusion of Muslims migrants and the threat it poses ultimately on its Christian identity.

Due to the large immigrant populations of non-Christians moving into Europe, governments have created policies which either socially include or socially exclude migrants. Countries with multiculturalism tendencies tend to support policies aimed at ensuring religious freedom by recognizing religious equality. These countries allow the universalistic and inclusive sentiment guide their social rights. Canada, which is deeply committed to its multicultural integration policy, has faced minor issues in incorporating Muslims. However, the percent of Muslim migrants to Canada remains small compared to Europe (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). Sweden is the most tolerant in Europe with the most open immigration and multicultural integration policies. After two years of legal

residence, the Swedish government awards immigrants same social and some of the same political rights as natives. Swedes are also the most supportive of the idea of ‘granting rights immediately to immigrants without prior contributions’ (OECD, 2013).

Under *laïcité*, the separation of church and state, devoutly secular France established all religions equal. In 2003 the French Council on the Muslim Religion finally succeeded at getting Islam recognized as an equal to established religions in France (Engler, 2007; Joppke & Torpey, 2013). In 2004, as an attempt to further their secular ideals, France moved to ban all religious symbols in public institutions—schools, government buildings and hospitals. This ultimately meant no crucifixes, no stars of David, no kippahs (commonly known as yamakas), and no headscarves, thus removing all religions from the public sphere. The most controversial French law regarding religion was passed in 2010, which banned the public adornment of all headgear that would cover the face. This was perceived as a direct attack on the Muslim Burqa (Antonsich, 2012; Joppke & Torpey, 2013). It appears that France tried to make everyone equal, but in the process, stripped many people of their religious identity.

Where France’s issues spawn from “social inclusion”, Germany’s are predominately “exclusive”. The rejection of multiculturalism in Germany has effected the establishment of Turkish Islamic immigrant institutions and has stunted their role in the German society. Germany does not to recognize Islam as a church under its “constitutional law of religion” (Religionsverfassungsrecht). In order to collect church taxation benefits, receive any kind of state subsidy for religious or cultural activities, or be able to teach religion in the school curriculum, churches must be granted “corporation under public law” (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) (Doomernick, 2007; Joppke & Torpey, 2013). To

date, Islam still has not been granted this status. In response, Turkish Migrant Umbrella Organizations (TMUOs) were organizations formed to preserve and protect the Turkish culture through religious or political action, as well as promote the interests of their members. Two thirds of the TMUOs support the integration of Turkish Muslims into German society by means of educating its members on the German culture and Germany's political and legal systems (Doomernick, 2007).

There are differences between Islam in Europe and Islam in North America. European governments are trying to incorporate a religion, while North America is integrating immigrants. Although an important distinction must be made: the Muslim immigrants in Europe verses in North America are not inherently the same. The small populations of Muslim immigrants in North America fare well. They integrate with little, if not any help from government. They integrate through society and the labor force, they have comparatively high economic and educational status, and on average are better educated and earn higher wages than most North Americans. Europe, in comparison, has a large, low educated and low skilled population of Muslim immigrants, creating a socio-demographic issue (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). Europe has claimed to not be region of migrants, but the immigrant populations have not stopped growing since World War II. It has only been within the last decade that migrants have been referred to by their religion as opposed to their origin. In France, Moroccans and Algerians were foreign workers or their post-colonial immigrants. In Germany, Turkish migrants were guest workers or Turks. In the United States, Muslims were either African or Arab immigrants, but often the Arabs in Los Angeles and Detroit were actually Christians. After the

terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001, Muslims became identifiable by their religion, as opposed to their nationality (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). This undeniable stereotyping of the Islamic religion by western cultures has caused an increase of tension and discrimination.

The European Union's first major breakthrough in developing policy to deal with migration, integration, xenophobia and discrimination came with the passing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Article 13 is an anti-discrimination policy designed to combat discrimination and xenophobia. Under this article, the European Monitoring Center for Discrimination and Xenophobia was created. It was replaced in 2007 by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which uses data from EU countries to help EU members and institutions confront the issues they face in ensuring fundamental rights to everyone (FRA, 2012). The ultimate goal of the anti-discrimination policy is to ensure formal and substance rights, and equality to migrants and naturalized citizens. Although these groups may be entitled to certain rights and benefits by law, but in the face of discrimination and racism, they may not be able to enjoy them as a native citizen does (Schierup, Hansen & Castels, 2006). Over the last decade, there have been some improvements in anti-discrimination legislation, illustrated by the creation of laws on the national level.

For example, the 1976 Race Relations Bill in the UK had expanded the definition of discrimination. It included direct and indirect discrimination, which considered conditions that may be non-discriminatory, but penalize members of racial groups disproportionately. However, the Race Relations Act of 2000 took it further by extending the anti-discrimination policies to all public bodies, and emphasized a 'general duty' on

authorities to strive for the elimination of discrimination and promote equality of opportunity (Hansen, 2007). In 2006, France passed the Law of Equal Opportunities (loi pour l'égalité des chances) to help combat the discrimination against immigrants and improve opportunities for the marginalized immigrants living in the city suburbs (*banlieue*). Programs were created to promote education and access to the labor market, especially for youth with migrant or disadvantaged backgrounds (Engler, 2007). But unfortunately, the laws cannot easily change individuals' personal opinion on immigrants and race relations.

Despite the efforts to reduce discrimination, the 1997 Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no. 47.1 discovered that many of the respondents who declared themselves as racists were actually xenophobic. In fact, 35 percent of the respondents admitted to being at least "quite racist". Regardless, over 90 percent of respondents believe in 'equality before the law' and 'rights to education and training' should be respected in all circumstances. In addition, 80 percent added the right to 'legal protection against discrimination', 'to live with one's family', 'to housing', 'to own language and culture', 'to religion liberty and conscience' and 'freedom of speech'. On average 70 percent believed that minority groups were discriminated against in the job market. The results of the Eurobarometer 393 on Discrimination in the EU in 2012 revealed 56 percent of the respondents believed that discrimination on the grounds of "ethnic origin" in the labor market was "widespread" or prevalent today—a 6 percent decrease since 2009. It's followed closely by disability and sexual orientations with 46 percent each, while religion is much lower with 39 percent. Furthermore, 17 percent of respondents have experienced discrimination, which remains fairly constant with the 16 percent in 2009. Of the 17

percent, 13 percent have been discriminated against on one ground presented by the Eurobarometer and 4 percent on multiple grounds. Also, 27 percent of respondents who say they belong to a minority group are more likely than Europeans on average to report that they have personally experienced discrimination. The perceived discrimination in everyday life is comparatively much lower than in the labor force. Discrimination on the grounds of “ethnic origin” is 47 percent and “religion” is 33 percent. Those who perceived discrimination of ethnic origin or religion to be “widespread” were most likely those who had personally experienced or witnessed discrimination, belonged a minority, were young, were left of the political spectrum, have completed more education, had a diverse social circle and had foreign born parents (Eurobarometer 393, 2012).

Individual opinions in member states varied in their responses concerning how widespread discrimination is on the grounds of “ethnic origin.” The numbers range from 26 percent in Latvia and Poland to 75 and 76 percent in Sweden and France, with Germany and the UK in the middle with 51 and 57 percent, respectively. On the grounds of religion, however, there is a much bigger gap because so many view the discrimination to be ‘rare’ or ‘non-existent’. For instance, in the Czech Republic 80 percent believe that discrimination on the basis of religion is rare, compared to 10 percent who believe it is widespread. In France, 66 percent believe it is widespread and 28 percent believe it is rare. The most significant part is that overall, only 2 percent believe that discrimination based on “ethnic origin” is non-existent and 5 percent based on “religion”. The numbers suggest that discrimination in the workplace and in everyday life still prevail (Eurobarometer 393, 2012).

Immigrants face a vicious cycle in a new country. They must be employed to ensure financial stability to gain the communities' trust as a functioning and productive member of society, and to demonstrate their ability to support a family when they apply for citizenship. At the same time, they are often discriminated in the work force, are often overqualified for their jobs and have to compete with natives for the same jobs. Low skill, low educated migrants are often employed in dirty, dangerous and demeaning jobs for long hours with low wages (Stalker, 2008). Furthermore, natives often negatively stereotype all immigrants to be undocumented migrants. They assume that immigrants do not pay taxes, live off only welfare benefits, thus, are burdens to society. Depending on the country, immigrants may be awarded social rights within the first year and political rights after about five years, or they may not get any rights until they are naturalized citizens. They can be governmental taxes, which include the social security payments, property, city, state, federal taxes, or they impose excise and sales taxes on consumer goods. Thus migrants do pay taxes and if migrants are in the country illegally, they are paying in some form of tax.

Conclusion

The integration of immigrants has proven to be challenging for both government and society. On one hand nations would like to judge the success of their integration policy by the extent to which migrants incorporate themselves into society without society changing. But “[informal] multiculturalism is less a choice than an unintended and often most unwelcome outcome” (Freeman 2000; 961), which hints at the fact that incorporation may work best when there are mutual concessions and compromises. This

disconnect between the expectations and realities of incorporation perpetuates these issues. In societies that emphasize the importance of assimilation, natives have an unrealistic goal for first generation migrants. There is an expectation to assimilate linguistically, behaviorally, culturally, and sometimes religiously is greater than migrants are capable of complying.

This has a lot to do with the change in composition of migrants over the past few decades. The migrants who countries want likely do not match those whom they ultimately get. Due to transportation advancements, countries have less control over who arrives than they did sixty years ago. At that time, migrants were often still arriving slowly by sea, but now people can travel faster for little money. Regardless of public opposition to rising immigration, there is a constant need for immigrant workers in growing economies. They are needed to fill the undesirable jobs and industries in which natives will not work, to cushion replacement rates, and to help pay for the welfare states.

Ultimately as immigration rates continue to rise, natives tolerate only certain types of immigrants. Generally, they do not like undocumented migrants, as they are perceived to lower the wages of native citizens, to not assimilate and to not pay taxes. Similarly, higher inflows of asylum seekers are associated with negative reactions from natives. The general wish to decrease the admittance of asylum seekers does not stem from humanitarian concerns, but instead from the perception that refugees are too dependent on government support (Mayda, 2006). Governments continuously try to attract highly skilled, highly educated migrants even though low educated migrants outnumber them. Overall, however, the number of highly educated migrants is increasing. In 2005, 26 million migrants in OECD countries held a university degree,

while 5.2 million held tertiary degrees (Widmaier & Dumont, 2011). On average, 29 percent of immigrants in the OECD have tertiary degrees, compared to only 24 percent of native-born (OECD, 2013). Unfortunately, 30 percent of migrants have jobs for which they are grossly overqualified. All in all, there is a substantial increase in highly educated immigrants, as they tend to stay in the new country longer and are more likely to naturalize (Hochman, 2011).

In fact, it is sometimes easier to migrate within the OECD for migrants who are highly skilled or highly educated. Citizens of the EU member nations enjoy the freedom of movement and employment within the Schengen Zone. There is also an initiative of the EU to attract highly educated, highly skilled workers from non-EU nations. With a valid work contract from an employer in a EU member state, migrants are issued the “EU Blue card”, allowing them to live and work in Europe. On a global level, temporary study and work visas are good ways to increase the number of highly skilled, highly educated migrants in OECD countries. These visas are not only growing in popularity, but governments with quotas are also increasing the numbers available. Unfortunately, the conditions and constraints of temporary visas and discrimination against migrants in the labor market often force these migrants to return home.

Language acquisition is highly regarded as a crucial part of assimilation. Unfortunately, the difficulty of this process is widely underestimated. States that provide proficient language courses make incorporation easier for immigrants. Immigrant groups who refuse to speak the native language are inevitably considered as “unable to assimilate” (Huntington, 2004). The acquisition of the host country’s language allows immigrants to communicate with the community around them, and provides them with

the opportunity to advance in their careers. Large portions of under-educated migrants arriving in OECD countries have little or no required language skills. The length of time required to acquire proficiency in a second language depends on a number of factors. When the individual's starting level is low, it takes longer to become acquainted with the second language. Second languages with the same writing system as the native language are easier to learn, but, learning a new writing system requires more time and dedication such, Latin, Greek or the Cyrillic alphabet, or Chinese logographics, or even Arabic Abjads. The manner in which a language is taught and the design of the course can affect how one learns the language. Individualized learning is the most effective, but also the most expensive. Classroom courses can have an overwhelming student to teacher ratio, subjecting students to minimal individualized attention. An important part of learning a second language is the dedication to learning, using and practicing it outside the course; the more an individual maximizes outside learning, the easier the language becomes. Finally, there is the dilemma of the opportunity cost of whether an immigrant is able to sacrifice enough time off from work to learn the native language and whether the government provides any financial support to help migrants afford the costs of acquiring the second languages. For countries that require a minimum achieved language level, it could take anywhere from three months to a year to achieve even the basics. The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEF) is an outline of language proficiency requirements, where levels A1 and A2 are recognized as basic users, B1 and B2 as independent users, and C1 and C2 as proficient users (Council of Europe, 2000).

Do natives truly believe migrants have assimilated or do they continually project their fears on new migrant groups and become “immune” to previous migrants? The fact that integration and naturalization policy reflects more of the natives’ opinions on how integration should be conducted—demanding language, citizenship and cultural exams, oaths to the nation, and declining applications of dual citizenship—it is no wonder that some countries have less naturalization than others. Being the most open in terms of immigration and integration policy, Sweden has a fairly high percentage of their foreign population naturalizing, in comparison to the falling naturalization rates of countries with more rigorous policies in countries such as Austria and Germany (OECD, 2013). Governments supporting the incorporation of immigrants into society do so by granting them access to the government through denizen rights, providing greater access to the labor market, and protecting immigrants under anti-discrimination policy, and easing the naturalization policy induces migrants to naturalize. Just as natives want immigrants to feel a sense of loyalty and belonging to the country, immigrants want to feel accepted and to be a part of society. Given time, immigrants will assimilate. Research suggests that not only do immigrants assimilate after living in the host state over a long period of time, but also that they are assimilating at measurably faster rates (Vigdor, 2008). Notably, the Chicago School of Sociology believes that “at least three generations are necessary for immigrants to become fully assimilated Americans” (Ireland, 2004; 4). However, increased deterioration to the earlier forms of assimilation and unresolved issues in incorporating Hispanics in the United States and Muslims in Europe have only led to more conflict, discrimination and xenophobia. Thus making it increasingly more difficult for new groups of migrants to openly renounce their

nationalities for societies that seem to not want them. Each country discussed has unique internal factors governing the success of immigrant incorporation. Although there are similarities among countries' policies, countries are dealing with different groups of immigrants with different skill sets and different reasons for immigrating. The relationship between the similarities and differences provide researchers the necessary data to find ample trends in the immigrant incorporation across countries.

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